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This Essay presents a novel proposal for counter balancing "copyright
overspills." In the background of the discussion is the common reality
of users succumbing to rights holders' attempts to license uses which
are most likely fair uses or completely free of copyright protection.
These practices have attracted considerable attention in recent litera-
ture. Most scholarly proposals in this context emphasize the need to
clarify the contours of the fair use doctrine and to remove doctrinal
ambiguities. Yet these initiatives are probably insufficient to overcome
users' risk aversion in copyright markets due to an inherent structural
imbalance within copyright law. While the law is designed around the
prevailing narrative of providing an incentive for innovation, it is quite
oblivious to providing an incentive to challenge copyright overspills.
The Essay argues, then, that users should be provided with an actual
incentive to challenge undue attempts to broaden the scope of copy-
right.
The proposal draws on the experience acquired in other branches of
intellectual property. More specifically, it is inspired by the unique sys-
tem of incentives created under the Hatch-Waxman Act in order to
encourage generic pharmaceutical companies to challenge pharma-
ceutical patents. These incentives have led to a significant rise in the
number of patent challenges in the pharmaceutical field. In the spirit of
the Hatch- Waxman regime, the Essay discusses the introduction of an
incentive to challenge into copyright law to offset copyright overspills.
It then proposes to develop an affirmative copyright misuse doctrine,
which would entitle successful challengers of copyright overspills to
statutory damages. Beyond the doctrinal proposals, the Essay's more
fundamental conclusion is that, in order to achieve the desired access-
incentive equilibrium, copyright law should not be concerned merely
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Law Faculty. For valuable comments and
helpful discussions I thank Yitzhak Goldstein, Guy Pessach, Marketa Trimble, Ofer
Tur-Sinai, Steven Wilf, the participants of the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference
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with providing an optimal degree of incentive to innovate but also with
providing users with an adequate incentive to challenge.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 172
I. THE NEED FOR AN INCENTIVE TO CHALLENGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW .............. ..................... 173
A. Copyright's Overspill Externalities............. ...... 173
B. Overcoming Overspills and the Balance of Incentives........... 175
II. INCENTIVE TO CHALLENGE: THE HATCH-WAXMAN REGIME.......178
III. APPLICATION TO COPYRIGHT ................... ....... 181
A. The Conceptual Framework ................ ........ 181
B. Incentive to Challenge and Copyright Misuse.......................183
CONCLUSION ........................................ ..... 187
INTRODUCTION
Recent copyright scholarship correctly identifies that copyright protec-
tion produces a chilling effect on legitimate and permitted uses.' The
principal cause for this phenomenon is the unpredictability of the fair use
doctrine coupled with general risk aversion by users.2 The combination of
the two discourages users from challenging rights holders' payment re-
quirements and encourages users to seek licenses even for permitted and fair
uses.3 This practice, which Jennifer Rothman has termed "the clearance
culture,"I leads to the de facto broadening of copyright law beyond its de
jure limits and to the corresponding shrinking of the public domain. Nu-
merous proposals have been made to deal with this phenomenon, most of
which aim to increase the clarity and certainty in the application of copy-
right law's exceptions, particularly the fair use doctrine.5
This Essay shares the above concerns but proposes a different concep-
tual approach for addressing them. This approach is inspired by one field
of intellectual property where rights are constantly being challenged by
prospective users to the benefit of the public domain and the public in
general. This is the field of pharmaceuticals, governed by the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the
I. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1271 (2008); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Lw, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007); Jennifer Rothman, The Questionable Use of Cus-
tom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) [hereinafter Rothman, Custom].
2. Cotter, supra note 1, at 1284-88; Gibson, supra note 1, at 891-94. As demonstrat-
ed below, risk aversion characterizes particularly those users whose use of copyrighted works
is scattered and incidental. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14, 28-29.
3. Gibson, supra note 1, at 884; Rothman, Custom, supra note 1, at 1911.
4. Jennifer Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the
Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 75 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 371, 371 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Rothman, Best Intentions]; Rothman, Custom, supra note 1, at 1911.
5. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 1, at 935-47; infra notes 18-19.
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"Hatch-Waxman Act."6 The Act contains a complex set of provisions,
among them the provision commonly known as "Paragraph IV."7 "Para-
graph IV" creates a detailed intellectual property challenging mechanism
by granting a 180-day generic exclusivity to the first company that files a
generic drug for approval and successfully challenges the patents protecting
the innovator's ("brand-name") drug. This substantial incentive has led to
the development of vibrant patent-challenging litigation in the pharmaceuti-
cal field, which narrows patent overspills by striking out weak patents or by
accelerating entry of generic substitutes into the market, to the benefit of the
public.8
Without being oblivious to the difficulties entailed in the implementa-
tion of the Hatch-Waxman Act, nor to proposals for various amendments to
the Act on the part of many scholars, I believe this regime carries an im-
portant conceptual lesson for copyright law: copyright's prevailing narrative
should not be concerned merely with providing an incentive for innovation.
In order to counter-balance copyright overspills and maintain the desired
incentive-access equilibrium, copyright law should also provide users with
an adequate incentive to challenge.
The Essay, then, proceeds as follows: Part I describes the need for an
incentive to challenge in copyright law. Building on existing literature dis-
cussing copyright's expansion beyond its statutory scope, it argues that most
current proposals to remedy this phenomenon are likely to be insufficient to
overcome users' risk aversion. The analysis further demonstrates that in
order to counterbalance copyright overspills, the law should provide users
with an affirmative incentive to challenge. Part II briefly describes the in-
centive to challenge regime in the field of pharmaceutical patents as
established under the Hatch-Waxman Act and considers its conceptual sig-
nificance for copyright law. Part III explores how an incentive to challenge
regime can be incorporated in copyright doctrine, particularly the develop-
ment of an affirmative copyright misuse doctrine and the introduction of a
statutory damages remedy for copyright misuse. Concluding remarks fol-
low.
I. THE NEED FOR AN INCENTIVE TO CHALLENGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyright's Overspill Externalities
This Essay was sparked by a personal experience. I was about to pub-
lish an academic book entitled "Popularity and Networks in Copyright
6. The current version is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). Previous codification
was scattered among sections of 15, 21, 35 and 42 U.S.C. The differences between the ver-
sions are immaterial for our purposes here.
7. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv) (2010).
8. See discussion of the Hatch-Waxman scheme infra Part II.
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Law,"9 and was discussing the exciting issue of the front cover with a col-
league. He proposed that the cover present several famous cartoon
characters, as these popular works are, after all, the subject of the book. "I
don't have the budget for licensing these images," I told him. "It's probably
fair use," he observed, "you don't actually need a license." "You're right," I
replied. "Still, I cannot risk being sued by the studios." The idea was thus
abandoned.
This anecdote is merely a small example of copyright's chilling effect.
As James Gibson recently observed, copyright markets are characterized by a
"license-don't-litigate" policy: a tendency to license each and every use of
underlying works, even when there is a strong fair use case or other defense
against infringement.'o Several prominent factors can explain this overly con-
servative policy. First, the doctrinal ambiguities in the law itself, particularly in
the fair use doctrine, make the ex ante prediction of the prospects of a fair
use argument largely uncertain, which in turn directs users towards seeking
a clearance." A second, related factor is users' risk aversion: as highlighted
by James Gibson and Thomas Cotter, the risks of being sued, which entail
litigation costs and may also have insurance implications, often outweigh
the perceived advantage of a free use.12 Furthermore, while rights holders
often have a clear incentive to enforce copyright protection in an overly ex-
pansive manner, the costs of individual licenses for uses which are de jure
permitted may be relatively modest, and the overall damage resulting from
over-expansive copyright is often dispersed over a large number of users.
Each user therefore lacks a clear incentive to object to such overspill.13
Thus, some users may well decide to abandon a desired use, despite its ac-
tual legality, as illustrated by the famous example of director John Else. Else
attempted to use a very short segment from The Simpsons in the background
of a documentary film. He abandoned the idea after rights holders requested
he pay thousands of dollars, despite receiving legal advice that his use was
in fact a fair use.'4 In other instances where the requested fee is relatively
modest, seeking a clearance is often the rational choice even for repeat, so-
phisticated players in the media industry who are acquainted with the
intricacies of copyright law's limitations. The result is that copyright protec-
9. MICHAL SHUR-OFRY, POPULARITY AND NETWORKS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2011).
10. Gibson, supra note 1, at 891.
I1. Id. See Cotter, supra note 1, at 1284 (highlighting the inherent uncertainty of the
fair use doctrine); Rothman, Custom, supra note 1, at 1910-11 (criticizing the ambiguity in
the application of fair use by courts).
12. Cotter, supra note 1, at 1284 88; Gibson, supra note 1, at 893-94.
13. See Cotter, supra note 1, at 1274 (making a similar observation); Alexander
Peukert, A European Public Domain Supervisor, INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1711745 (highlighting the
asymmetry between users' and owners' incentives).
14. For a detailed account of this affair, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S
PARADOX 15-17 (2008); Staking Claims in Cyberspace, DUKE MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2003, avail-
able at http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/issues/091003/claims lhtml.
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tion spills over to deter uses beyond the scope of the rights granted under
the Copyright Act.
Moreover, scholars correctly indicate that this "clearance culture" fur-
ther influences the fair use doctrine in a circular manner, since courts often
consider non-conformity with industry practices as a factor weighing
against fair use." This circular feedback, then, results in further shrinking of
the public domain.
Copyright overspills are further enhanced by additional market circum-
stances and rights holders' practices. For example, Joseph Liu has recently
highlighted the tendency of copyright intermediaries to disable or prohibit
certain otherwise-permitted uses by end-users for fear of incurring liability
due to their enablement.16 Jason Mazzone discussed the similarly problem-
atic practice of rights holders making unfounded allegations as to the
subsistence of copyright in certain copyright-free contents-such as court
cases, legislative materials, or materials in which copyright has long ex-
pired-and the conditioning of use upon unjustified conditions."
B. Overcoming Overspills and the Balance of Incentives
Against this background, copyright scholars are currently engaged in a
thriving discussion of possible solutions to the overspill phenomenon. A
series of proposals have been put forward in this context. Most of them aim
to increase the clarity of the fair use doctrine and other copyright standards
in hopes that greater certainty will encourage users to object to copyright
overspills.'5 These efforts have led to the establishment of "fair use best
practices" in various fields that strive to represent the understandings and
practices of various industries as to permitted uses. 19 Others suggest further
15. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 897 (describing the "doctrinal feedback" of overly
conservative licensing practices); Rothman, Custom, supra note 1, at 1902 (highlighting that
courts consider non-conformity with industry practices as a basis for rejecting fair use).
16. Joseph P. Liu, Toward a Defense of Fair Use Enablement, or How U.S. Copyright
Law Is Hurting My Daughter, 75 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 101, 103-04 (2010) (analyzing this
tendency and further proposing a defense of "fair use enablement" to intermediaries).
17. See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1027-99 (2006) (de-
scribing varieties of such practices, which he terms "copyfrauds"); Cory Tadlock, Copyright
Misuses, Fair Use, and Abuse: How Sports and Media Companies Are Overreaching Their
Copyright Protections, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 621, 640-45 (2008) (describ-
ing the practices of overly broad copyright warnings employed by entities in the sports and
media industry).
18. See Gibson, supra note 1, at 934-42 (admitting though that this solution is far
from simple); cf Gideon Parchomovsy & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1483, 1497-1503 (2007) (advocating the introduction of "harbors" that define mini-
mum levels of uses as "fair").
19. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren et al., Fair Use Best Practices for Higher Education
Institutions: The Israeli Experience, J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1648408 (describing an initiative to establish "fair use best practic-
es" for Israeli academic institutions); Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 4, at 1909-65
(describing the spreading phenomenon of fair use practices). For a specific example of a practice
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expanding educational measures, such as law clinics, aimed at educating
and encouraging the public to exercise its fair use rights.2 0 An additional
proposal calls for the establishment of a "public domain supervisor" that
will represent the interests of the public in public and political fora that are
frequently influenced more by stakeholders than by users.2
A critical analysis of these proposals is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Briefly, however, "fair use best practices" have been criticized for being
designed without the involvement of stakeholders and for being more wish-
ful thinking than an actual representation of the law. 22 On the other hand,
the related proposal to establish statutory fair use "safe harbors" may elimi-
nate the inherent flexibility of the current fair use doctrine, and may also
prove to be a double-edged sword if statutorily permitted uses intended as
minimums instead become de facto maximums when interpreted by
courts.23
The concern I wish to highlight here, however, is of a more general na-
ture. Most of the measures proposed in recent scholarly discussion, even if
presumably desirable and even if implemented in their entirety, may be in-
sufficient to significantly decrease users' risk aversion and their lack of
incentive to challenge stakeholders' demands. 24 A simple economic calcula-
tion indicates that in many instances, paying a modest clearance fee to
stakeholders may be the rational choice, even for sophisticated users who
are repeat players in the media industry. Consider the following (hypothet-
ical) example: a newspaper wishes to quote several lines of Martin Luther
King's "I Have a Dream" speech. Now, imagine that King's estate requires a
fee of $400 for this use.25 The newspaper receives legal advice that the
that was established by several organizations, see Fair Use Principles forUser-Generated Con-
tent, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., available at http://www.eff.org/files/UGCFair Use_
BestPractices_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). But see infra note 22 and accompanying
text (describing Rothman's criticism of these practices).
20. Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 4, at 386.
21. See Peukert, supra note 13. See also Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 430-47 (2009) (proposing the establishment of a public agency
to regulate and administer fair use). Other ideas raised in this context are the establishment
of a public domain registry to minimize "copyfrauds" and the formation of a "fair use ena-
blement" defense for intermediaries that facilitate fair use by third parties. See Liu, supra
note 16, at 119-22; Mazzone, supra note 17, at 1090-91.
22. See, e.g., Rothman, Best Intentions, supra note 4, at 376.
23. Gibson, supra note 1, at 884-85, 938; cf Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note
18, at 1524-28 (acknowledging these objections but estimating that the concerns are exag-
gerated).
24. For a similar observation see Cotter, supra note 1, at 1312-18 (noting that
"tinkering" with fair use may be an ineffective means for overcoming the problem of
over-enforcement).
25. Although the example is hypothetical, it does not seem completely farfetched. Cf
KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTH-
ER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY 33 (2005) (describing how the author was asked to pay over
$200 to the copyright holders for quoting four sentences from the "I Have a Dream" speech,
[Vol. 18:171
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quote is probably a fair use and the consent of the rights holders is therefore
unnecessary. Yet, from an ex ante perspective, the newspaper must also take
into account the potential costs of challenging the rights holder's position.
These include the low chances that the fair use argument will eventually be
rejected and the newspaper will have to pay a substantial amount of statuto-
ry damages for copyright infringement.26 Often, these also include the costs
of litigation [Le] and the possible increase in the costs of insurance [IJ re-
sulting from the mere filing of the suit.27 Thus, when the ex post statutory
damages may amount to $150,000 for willful infringement or $30,000 for a
"regular" infringement, and the ex ante clearance fee is relatively modest
($400 in our example), the rational and risk-averse user is likely to pay
the fee rather than challenge the rights holder's demand, even when the
prospect of succeeding in a fair use argument is as high as 80%.28 Another
rational alternative would be to avoid using the content in question alto-
gether, assuming that such use is not critical for the user's project.29 This
option may be particularly attractive for incidental, non-industry users
whose familiarity with the subtleties of permitted uses may be more lim-
ited.30
This analysis reveals an inherent structural imbalance within copyright
law. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that copyright law is not only con-
cerned with the incentive to innovate, but also seeks to achieve an (ever
elusive) equilibrium between incentivizing innovation and additional values
which necessitate access to copyrighted works.3' De jure, this balance is
and further detailing how USA Today, which in 1993 reprinted the speech in its entirety to
mark its thirtieth anniversary, was sued by the estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (providing that willful copyright infringement
may entitle the copyright owner to statutory damages up to a maximum amount of
$150,000). Under subsection (1) of this provision, the amount of statutory damages in the
absence of willful infringement can reach $30,000. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheat-
land, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 441 (2009)
(noting that the "willfulness" requirement has been interpreted quite broadly by courts).
27. See supra text accompanying note 12.
28. Roughly, the calculation is: $400 [Clearance Fee] < $30,000 / $6,000 [claim's
estimated prospects of 20% x maximum statutory damages of $150,000 or $30,000, respec-
tively] + Lc + Ic. True, this is a very rough illustration, as the amount of statutory damages
awarded in a certain case may be lower than the maximum amount and the ex ante prospects
of a claim cannot be accurately evaluated. However, the illustration does serve to demon-
strate the distorted "balance of incentives" under the present regime.
29. Consider, again, the example of John Else, who renounced using a segment of The
Simpsons as a background in his documentary. See NETANEL, supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text.
30. Joseph Liu colorfully illustrates this point by describing his daughter's decision to
refrain from drawing "famous" characters altogether. See Liu, supra note 16, at 104-05.
31. The latter statement is of course oversimplified, since copyright law can and does
promote additional interests besides creating incentives, such as personality interests or
Lockean values. See, e.g., ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9-10, 140
(2011) (arguing for pluralism regarding the normative foundations of IP while emphasizing
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achieved by the introduction of limitations to the scope of copyright. Yet, as
demonstrated above, the law's current structure results in the de facto ex-
pansion of copyright beyond its intended scope. In other words, while
copyright law is designed around the prevailing narrative of providing an
incentive to innovate, it is quite oblivious to providing an incentive to chal-
lenge copyright overspills. Decreasing the law's ambiguity may improve the
situation in some cases, but would not significantly affect this imbalance in
many others. As Thomas Cotter recently observed in the context of fair use,
the doctrine "relies on individuals to champion the public interest . . . with-
out providing them with sufficient incentive to do so."132 Protecting the
equilibrium envisioned by the legislature, then, requires forming a regime to
incentivize users to affirmatively challenge the scope of copyright.
Interestingly, a look beyond the contours of copyright law reveals that
such a mechanism has already been introduced in another area of intellectu-
al property law. I am referring to the field of pharmaceutical generic
litigation under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, commonly known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act."" Before taking a clos-
er look at the incentive to challenge regime under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a
caveat is in order. Indeed, the Act regulates a different subject matter, and its
provisions cannot be copied and pasted into copyright law in a verbatim
manner for numerous reasons that are discussed below.34 Yet, despite this
caveat, the incentive to challenge regime under the Hatch-Waxman Act is an
important example that can inspire the establishment of a market-based in-
centive to challenge mechanism within copyright law. The following Part
takes a closer look at this scheme.
II. INCENTIVE TO CHALLENGE: THE HATCH-WAXMAN REGIME
The Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a complex web of provisions con-
cerning both patent law and drug-approval processes by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). A complete review of these terms is beyond the
scope of this Essay.35 Rather, for our purposes it is sufficient to describe the
unique incentive to challenge system the Act created.
The legislation was motivated, at least in part, by the notion that innova-
tive ("brand-name") drug companies sometimes succeed in registering weak
that these foundations cannot be limited to utilitarian concepts); Justin Hughes, The Philoso-
phy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287 (1988).
32. Cotter, supra note 1, at 1274.
33. 21 U.S.C. 355 (2006).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
35. For a more comprehensive review of the Act's provisions, see Michael Carrier,
Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 37 (2009); Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 282 (2011); Alfred Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharma-
ceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389 (1999).
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and low-quality patents whose validity is questionable. 6 These patents ex-
tend the de facto protection granted to certain drugs and may block the
market entry of generic competitors for many years beyond the life of the
initial patent that often protects the novel component of the drug.37
Indeed, patents are open to challenge even after their registration, and
defendants can raise invalidity arguments during infringement litigation.
Yet, despite these mechanisms, in the arena of pharmaceutical patents too,
risk aversion often prevailed. The inherent ex ante uncertainty of litigation
outcomes" combined with the substantial litigation costs in this field, which
can easily reach millions of dollars,39 hindered the challenging of patents
that protect "brand-name" pharmaceuticals. An additional burden to such
challenges was other players' ability to immediately take advantage of hold-
ings of invalidity obtained by a generic company.40 Much like in copyright
law, then, "patent overspills" prevailed: patents that did not actually reflect
non-obvious advancement over prior art were under-challenged, to the det-
riment of the public and the public domain.4 1
Against this background, the Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a sophisti-
cated set of provisions designed to increase generic manufacturers' incentive
to challenge, with the ultimate purpose of targeting the high prices of pharma-
ceuticals. First, it introduced a process of Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA"), which enables the FDA to approve generic versions of innovative
pharmaceutical drugs on the basis of demonstrated bioequivalence to an
already approved drug. 42 When the innovator's drug is patent-protected,
the generic firm may challenge such protection by filing an ANDA con-
taining a "Paragraph IV" certification. By so doing, the generic firm
alleges that the patents that are listed with the FDA database (commonly
36. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Pa-
tents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613 (forthcoming Dec. 2011) (manuscript at 25-26),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640512.
37. Id. manuscript at 6.
38. See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents 38 J. EcoN. PERSP. 75
(2005) (analyzing patents in terms of a right to attempt to exclude alleged infringers and
emphasizing that litigation outcomes are uncertain from an ex ante perspective).
39. See Dolin, supra note 35, at 14; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 36, manuscript at
9; see also Matthew Higgins & Stuart Graham, Balancing Innovation and Access: Patent
Challenges Tip the Scale, 326 SCIENCE 370 (2009).
40. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Pa-
tents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 9-10 (2004) (analyzing the "public good"
problem which creates a disincentive to challenge patents); see also Hemphill & Sampat,
supra note 36, manuscript at 9.
41. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Pa-
tents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 113-39 (2006) (referring mainly to patents whose subject
matter is not covered by the Hatch-Waxman Act).
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(2)(A) (2010). The bioequivalence requirement replaced
the need to conduct independent clinical trials to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the
generic pharmaceutical. See Dolin, supra note 35, at 9; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 36,
manuscript at 8.
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known as "the Orange Book") as protecting the innovator's drug are invalid
or not infringed by its own generic product.43 Such a "Paragraph IV" filing
normally triggers a patent infringement suit by the innovator in which the
questions of patent validity and infringement are litigated." In addition, and
most important for our purpose, the Act further provides that the first gener-
ic filer of an ANDA under "Paragraph IV" is entitled, under certain
conditions, to a 180-day period of generic exclusivity to sell its own ge-
neric product.45 In other words, during the generic exclusivity period, the
first filer can market and sell its generic product, while other filers of
ANDAs with respect to the same drug must wait at least until the expira-
tion of the generic exclusivity period before they can enter the market.
When the drug in question enjoys substantial sales, such "Paragraph IV"
exclusivity may be extremely valuable.46
Recent empirical research conducted by Scott Hemphill and Bhaven
Sampat demonstrates that this set of provisions, particularly the quasi-
intellectual property right set up by the "Paragraph IV" mechanism,4 7 was
indeed successful in establishing an environment that encourages patent
challenging among generic pharmaceutical firms.48 The number of patent
challenges following its introduction has dramatically increased.49 Moreo-
ver, as may be expected, patent quality is one of the significant factors
which influences the decision to challenge, and patent challenges under the
Hatch-Waxman regime indeed seek to target those weaker patents that are
more likely to create "patent overspills." 0
Admittedly, the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act in this context
and their implementation are not immune from difficulties and criticism.
Most of the criticism focuses on the practice of "reverse payment settle-
ments" which developed under the Act. Under these practices, the parties
settle the "Paragraph IV" litigation without obtaining a decision as to the
validity (or non-infringement) of the challenged patent. Under a typical
settlement agreement, generic entrance to the market is somewhat delayed
in return for a certain payment or other benefits from the innovator com-
43. 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(B)(iv).
44. For a detailed review of this mechanism, see Dolin, supra note 35, at 12-14.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The detailed conditions triggering the Paragraph IV
exclusivity are immaterial to our purpose.
46. Higgins & Graham, supra note 39, at 370 (noting that the average potential payoff
of the Paragraph IV challenge is $60 million in the first 180 days); see also C. Scott
Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-
Waxman Act, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1736822 (analyzing the value of the exclusivity period under the Act).
47. The right was termed "a mini-patent" by Hemphill & Lemley. See Hemphill &
Sampat, supra note 46, at 8.
48. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 36, manuscript at 14-15.
49. Higgins & Graham, supra note 39, at 370; see also Hemphill & Sampat, supra
note 36, manuscript at 3.
50. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 36, manuscript at 18-26.
[Vol. 18:171
Hatch- Warmanizing Copyright
pany.5' Current scholarship raises concerns that such settlements might
deprive the public of at least some of the benefits resulting from patent
challenges.52
A detailed review and evaluation of that criticism is certainly beyond
the scope of this Essay. As already emphasized, my aim is not to propose a
verbatim import of the Hatch-Waxman mechanism into copyright law. For
reasons discussed in Part III, such a measure would be both impractical and
undesirable.5 3 I do suggest, however, a more general insight that can be
drawn from the experience accumulated with respect to pharmaceutical
patents during the last few decades. The regime established under the
Hatch-Waxman Act carries an important conceptual lesson for copyright
law: it demonstrates that ex post market scrutiny of intellectual property
overspills is an obtainable task if the appropriate set of incentives is
embedded in the relevant law. It further demonstrates that providing a sig-
nificant incentive to challenge helps to overcome risk aversion and makes
a significant difference in the willingness of private actors to embark upon
the challenging of intellectual property rights.
This is a lesson that copyright law should seek to embrace. Like patent
law in the pharmaceutical field, copyright law cannot be confined to the
prevailing narrative of providing an incentive to create. Rather, in order to
counterbalance its overspill externalities, copyright, too, must concern itself
with providing an affirmative incentive to challenge. In the following Part, I
turn to explore possible manners of incorporating an incentive to challenge
regime within copyright law.
III. APPLICATION TO COPYRIGHT
A. The Conceptual Framework
In light of the previous analysis, several issues should be considered while
searching for an incentive to challenge regime that is suitable for copyright
law. First, the need to use private parties as effective guardians of the public
domain, by providing them with an adequate set of incentives, may be even
more crucial in the field of copyright than in the area of patents. The regis-
tration requirement that applies to patents entails an ex ante examination of
51. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, 2025: Reverse-Payment Settlements Unleashed, CPI
ANTITRUST J., Dec. 2010 (2) (criticizing the practice of reverse payment settlements from an
antitrust perspective); Dolin, supra note 35 (calling for a patent reexamination in cases of
reverse payment settlement); Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 46 (arguing that in order to
achieve the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the exclusivity under the Act should be granted
to the first generic company that actually enters the market).
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. For a discussion on strategies for delay-
ing generic entry developed by "brand-name" companies pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman
legislation, see Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 46, at 16-24.
53. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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patent applications prior to their grant. Despite its imperfections, the regis-
tration system does provide a certain level of administrative filtering of
patent overspills. 54 Such an administrative system does not exist with re-
spect to copyright subject matter, whose protection does not depend on any
formal registration. Indeed, several commentators have recently suggested
establishing various administrative measures in order to inhibit copyright
overspills.55 Yet the Hatch-Waxman experience suggests that a market-based
system that encourages ex post review and challenge by private parties is
feasible. Indeed, with an appropriate set of incentives, such a scheme can be
more efficient than administrative scrutiny. 56 Furthermore, this market-based
approach may be more consistent with the current structure and operation of
copyright law, and also with international agreements that do not allow sub-
jecting copyright to formalities.57 In addition, it does not involve the costs
entailed in establishing new regulatory mechanisms.
On the other hand, including an exact parallel of Hatch-Waxman exclu-
sivity in copyright law is neither desirable nor realistic. The differences
between the subject matter of copyright overspills and the overspills with
which the Hatch-Waxman Act is concerned are important and cannot be
ignored. An early market entry by a generic producer of a life-saving phar-
maceutical can be of vast significance to the public, which may justify an
incentive in the form of a generic marketing exclusivity, whose potential
value to the generic producer may be immense.58 The fair use of books, arti-
cles, films, or other copyright-protected works, while undoubtedly
significant from both economic and democratic perspectives, does not war-
rant such a powerful measure. Furthermore, successfully challenging the
validity of a pharmaceutical patent carries immediate general benefits to
other pharmaceutical players and to the public at large because the invalid
patent is erased from the registry. These benefits may justify the particular
incentive provided under the Hatch-Waxman Act to the first filer. On the
other hand, asserting that a particular use of a copyrighted work is a permit-
ted or a fair use is context-specific. Although such holdings may have
certain precedential value, their effect is less general.
54. But cf Farrell & Merges, supra note 40 (arguing that the ex ante administrative
scrutiny of patent applications by the Patent Office is limited and should be strengthened).
55. See, e.g., Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, supra note 21 (making various pro-
posals for regulating fair use through an administrative agency); Peukert, supra note 13
(suggesting the establishment of a European public domain supervisor); Pamela Samuelson
et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
1175, 1198 (2011) (proposing to reinvigorate the copyright registration requirement).
56. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 36.
57. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2),
Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30. The provision is incorporated by reference in Article 9(1) of
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement (1994) as well
as in Article 3 of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty
(1996).
58. See supra note 46.
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Moreover, in light of the differences in subject matter and in market
structure, providing a limited exclusive right to users is unlikely to create
any substantial incentive to challenge overspills in the copyright arena. Let
us consider, again, the hypothetical "I Have a Dream" example. 59 Imagine
that the newspaper seeking to use the segment from the speech successfully
challenges the rights holder's position and succeeds in litigating its fair use
argument. In return, it is granted a 180-day exclusivity in utilizing and li-
censing that segment. However, due to the modest license fee requested for
this use60 and the dispersed and incidental nature of potential licensees,61 the
value of such an exclusive right is likely to be rather limited. It is unlikely to
counterbalance the ex ante anticipated cost of challenging the scope of copy-
right nor would it create a real incentive to challenge.
The interim conclusion, then, is that-despite the inspiration provided
by the field of pharmaceutical patents--creating an incentive to challenge
regime in copyright law cannot be based upon providing exclusive rights
with respect to the challenged material. Rather, an incentive to challenge has
to be integrated into copyright law in a manner that would suit both the
structure of copyright markets and the nature of copyright subject matter.
This is where I turn in the following Section.
B. Incentive to Challenge and Copyright Misuse
My proposal is rather simple. Copyright law should employ the copyright
misuse principle as a vehicle for introducing an incentive to challenge regime
into copyright doctrine.62 The proposal is twofold: the first is the introduction
of statutory damages equal to the statutory damages for willful copyright
infringement as a potential remedy for copyright misuse. The second is the
recognition of copyright misuse as an affirmative doctrine that entitles users
to initiate legal proceedings against rights holders. Under this proposed
scheme, unduly objecting to a legitimate use (such as a fair use or a use of a
work in which the copyright has expired) would constitute copyright misuse
on the part of the rights holder.63 Moreover, a decision that copyright was
59. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
60. In our example, $400 per use.
61. See supra notes 1 -13 and accompanying text.
62. For the doctrine of copyright misuse in general, see, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLD-
STEIN ON COPYRIGHT (3rd. ed. 2008); Tom Bell, Codifying Copyright's Misuse Defense,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 573 (2007); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common
Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15
BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 865, 901-02 (2000); Ramsey Hanna, Misusing Antitrust: The Search
for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1994); Kathryn Judge,
Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901 (2004).
63. The term "unduly" implies that not every objection to a permitted use would be
deemed copyright misuse on the part of the rights holders. See infra note 71 and accompany-
ing text.
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indeed misused would give rise to a variety of remedies, including a right to
statutory damages for users whose rights were prejudiced.
Notably, the introduction of statutory damages as a remedy for copyright
misuse would most likely necessitate legislative intervention: the current statu-
tory damages provision in the Copyright Act concerns copyright infringement,
not copyright misuse. Moreover, the entire misuse doctrine is judge-made and
still relatively unformed, and the consequences of misusing copyright are not
entirely clear.M It is already apparent, however, that the misuse doctrine can
apply in a range of different circumstances and can yield a range of potential
outcomes, and that a holding of misuse does not result in the complete elim-
ination of copyright. 65 This state of affairs constitutes a rather convenient
background for implementing the current proposal.
This Essay does not intend to draw a complete set of statutory provi-
sions applying the principles suggested above. Rather, I merely aim to
sketch a general structure for a proposed solution, which reflects the conclu-
sions of the discussion in the previous sections. This structure warrants a
few words of explanation.
First, employing copyright misuse in order to create an incentive to
challenge copyright overspills is theoretically consistent with the raison
d'etre of the misuse doctrine. The fundamental problem that this Essay
seeks to address is the undue (and often successful) attempts on the part of
rights holders to expand copyright beyond its statutory scope. Preventing
copyright's expansion beyond the monopoly granted under the Copyright
Act is also the underlying rationale of the copyright misuse principle, as
acknowledged by several courts. 66 Moreover, the principle of copyright
misuse possesses inherent flexibility and can thus accommodate the doctri-
nal analysis proposed in the previous sections. 7
In addition, the proposed structure conceptualizes copyright misuse as
an affirmative right of users rather than merely a defense against infringe-
ment. This perspective is consistent with recent scholarship that calls for
recognizing various copyright doctrines as users' rights rather than mere
defenses. 68 Joseph Liu recently observed that this approach recognizes that
64. See references cited supra note 62.
65. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at § 11.6.
66. For prominent case law recognizing the principle and its underlying rationale, see,
e.g., Alcatel USA Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F3d. 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Lasercomb
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med.
Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
67. But cf Tadlock, supra note 17, at 644-45 (acknowledging the current limitations
of copyright misuse and proposing its expansion by courts in order to encompass overly
broad "copyright warnings" by sports and media companies).
68. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Users' Rights, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READING THE NEW
ISRAELI COPYRIGHT ACT (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds., 2009) (arguing that the
Israeli Copyright Act of 2007 should be read as establishing users' rights rather than mere
defenses); Liu, supra note 16, at 113 (proposing to regard fair use as an affirmative right); cf
Guy Pessach, Reverse Exclusion in Copyright Law-Reconfiguring Users' Rights (Apr. 17,
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certain permitted uses have intrinsic value and should thus be encouraged.69
Challenging copyright overspills is, I believe, an effective method to en-
courage uses possessing such an inherent value.
I do not imply, however, that each failed attempt to enforce copyright
should be considered copyright misuse on the part of rights holders.70 Ra-
ther, the proposed mechanism will only be triggered by an undue objection
to a certain permitted use. Thus, for example, a good faith objection to a
certain use whose ex ante permissibility is doubtful would not be considered
"undue," while a bad faith attempt to prevent a use whose ex ante permissi-
bility as a "fair use" is apparent, or to prevent a use of a work in which
copyright protection has already expired,7 may well give rise to a misuse
claim. This restriction is supported not only by intuitive notions of fairness
stemming from copyright's ethical core;72 it is also consistent with the need
to avoid over-deterrence of copyright owners seeking to enforce valid rights
and minimize abuse on the part of users.7n Admittedly, the "undue" require-
ment would warrant further development, and I do not attempt to fully
explore it in the framework of this Essay. Nor do I purport to sketch an
exhaustive set of circumstances that would be deemed "undue" objections
by rights holders. The inherent flexibility of the misuse doctrine would
enable the development of such circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
My proposal, then, envisages the following scenarios: unduly objecting
to a fair use or to other permitted uses would constitute copyright misuse. A
user would be able to raise a misuse allegation in response to a rights hold-
er's claim, but also to initiate independent proceedings against a rights
holder, alleging misuse of copyright. 74 Notably, the latter strategy, in which
the user is the plaintiff rather than a defendant, may minimize the implica-
tions of the proceedings on the costs of insurance. A decision that copyright
was misused could give rise to a variety of remedies, among them a right to
statutory damages to the user whose rights were prejudiced, in a maximum
2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1813082 (proposing
to conceptualize users' rights as "rights to exclude").
69. Liu, supra note 16, at 113 (making this observation in the context of fair use).
70. Nor do I argue that each and every contractual restriction of the rights of users of
copyright works should automatically be considered misuse of copyright. For a discussion of
this complex question, which is beyond the scope of this Essay, see Julie Cohen, Copyright
and the Jurisprudence of Self Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998); Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright in Cyberspace-Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (1998); Mark
Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 111 (1999); David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87
CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999); Maureen O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and
Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995).
71. For examples of the latter practices, see Mazzone, Copyfraud, supra, note 17.
72. For a discussion of copyright's ethical foundations, see MERGES, supra note 31, at
145, 291, 307; Hughes, supra note 31.
73. For more details, see infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
74. Cf Judge, supra note 62, at 932 (suggesting that copyright misuse should not be
confined to a mere defense, but could serve as a basis for requesting declaratory judgment).
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amount equivalent to the amount set out in the Copyright Act for willful
copyright infringement.75
Let us return for a moment to the "I Have a Dream" example discussed
above 76 and consider it under the proposed regime. Imagine now that the
newspaper decides to challenge the rights holder's position and object to its
attempt to limit the alleged fair use, either by filing a misuse claim or by
filing a counterclaim in response to the rights holder. From an ex ante per-
spective, the newspaper is now facing an 80% prospect of being awarded
statutory damages of up to $150,000. The economic balance of incentives
may shift in favor of copyright challenging. 77 The rights holder's ex ante
"incentive to over-enforce," on the other hand, decreases respectively. This
shift in the balance of incentives may cause the rights holder to act with
more restraint and to consent ex ante to the requested use of the short seg-
ment of the speech.
On a more general level, decisions that copyright was misused (by un-
due objection to permitted uses) will have a certain precedential value,
which is likely to affect other rights holders. Over time, then, creating an
incentive to challenge in the manner proposed here may encourage greater
self-restraint ab initio on the part of copyright owners.7 8
An objection that is likely to be raised in this context is that providing
an incentive to challenge would harm the incentive to create and dissemi-
nate copyright-protected works. 79 This objection raises a much broader
question-namely, whether the rights provided under the Copyright Act are
indeed required to incentivize the creation of copyright-protected subject
matter. This question is certainly beyond the scope of this Essay, which
takes the current copyright legislation as its baseline.80 Even under the cur-
rent framework, however, the objection seems normatively flawed:
copyright law is not designed to afford copyright owners a right to prevent
permitted uses or rights that are broader than those granted under the Copy-
75. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
76. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
77. Compare this to the situation in the absence of an incentive. See supra note 28.
78. Cf Michal Shur-Ofry, Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Lw, 59 U. TORONTO
L.J. 525, 576 (2009) (arguing, in a different context, that the development of the copyright
misuse doctrine is likely to increase self-restraint on part of rights holders in comparison to
reliance on fair use alone).
79. Cf Higgins & Graham, supra note 39 (arguing that the Paragraph IV incentive
under the Hatch-Waxman Act has damaged the incentive of innovative pharmaceutical com-
panies to develop new drugs).
80. For an interesting discussion see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as In-
centives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 29 (2011) (highlighting
the existence of multiple motivations for creation, including the significance of intrinsic
factors). For additional broad questions which arise in this context pertaining to copyright's
underlying rationales, see supra note 31.
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right Act, and incentivizing innovation should not be performed by allowing
copyright overspills.81
An additional, related argument that may be raised is the concern of
over-deterrence, or "misuse overspills." To a certain extent, this argument
mirrors the concerns of copyright overspills discussed earlier: an incentive
to challenge regime may deter copyright owners from enforcing valid rights
due to legal uncertainty coupled with risk aversion. Indeed, this is a concern
that should not be ignored. Embedding an incentive to challenge in copy-
right law should be performed carefully so as to correct the current
structural imbalance without producing another (opposite) imbalance. In the
context of the present doctrinal proposal, this concern is addressed by con-
fining misuse to "undue" objections to permitted uses on part of rights
holders.82 Such a requirement would minimize potential abuse on the part of
users and would reduce the risk of over-deterrence.83 A cautious introduc-
tion of an incentive to challenge would indeed help to minimize the gap
between the de jure scope of rights and their de facto expansion, and to cal-
ibrate the scope of copyright to the level actually intended by the legislature.
CONCLUSION
Copyright law is designed around the prevailing narrative of providing
an incentive for innovation. It is quite oblivious to providing users with an
incentive to challenge undue attempts to broaden copyright's scope. Recent
proposals raised in literature-particularly those concerned with clarifying
the fair use doctrine-are insufficient to resolve the copyright overspills
problem rooted in users' risk aversion. Yet the problems of overspills and of
under-challenging are not unique to copyright law but exist in other areas of
intellectual property as well. Looking beyond the contours of copyright re-
veals the dynamic relationship between copyright and other branches of
intellectual property law. More specifically, it demonstrates that in one
area-the field of pharmaceutical patents-an effective intellectual property
challenging mechanism already exists under the Hatch-Waxmian Act.
The regime established under the Hatch-Waxman Act carries an im-
portant conceptual lesson for copyright law: it indicates that an ex post
market scrutiny of intellectual property overspills is an obtainable task if the
81. Cf Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 36, manuscript at 28 (discussing a similar
argument raised in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and further noting that granting
patents that do not meet the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)'s patentability
standards is not an adequate way to incentivize).
82. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
83. Interestingly, similar concerns have also arisen in the context of the Hatch-Waxman
regime. The legislation was amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003, which contained certain provisions designed to prevent generic
drug companies from abusing the incentive granted to them. See generally Stephanie Greene,
A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market
Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309 (2005).
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appropriate set of incentives is embedded in the relevant law. It further
demonstrates that providing a significant incentive to challenge helps to
overcome users' risk aversion and makes a significant difference in the will-
ingness of private actors to challenge intellectual property rights.
Inspired by the Hatch-Waxman solution, copyright scholarship should
explore how an incentive to challenge can be inserted into the law in a man-
ner that would suit both copyright markets and copyright subject matter.
While not attempting to present a complete, detailed solution, this Essay
proposes to create such an incentive by developing an affirmative copyright
misuse doctrine that would entitle successful challengers to statutory dam-
ages. Developing this incentive to challenge scheme in further detail is a
challenge that remains for future research.
On a more general note, the analysis in this Essay reveals an interest-
ing interrelation between copyright and other branches of intellectual
property law. Although we sometime tend to regard different fields of
intellectual property as quite distinct, they may be more related than they
appear at first sight. The dynamic interrelations between the branches of
intellectual property and the potential lessons they carry for each other in-
deed deserve further thought and research.
